Birch Creek Irrigation and Marvin R. Mayers v. Earl J. Prothero and Lynn Prothero : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1992
Birch Creek Irrigation and Marvin R. Mayers v. Earl
J. Prothero and Lynn Prothero : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Andrew B. Berry, Jr.; Attorney for Plaintiffs/Respondents.
A. Dean Jeffs; Jeffs and Jeffs; Attorney for Defendants/Appellants.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Birch Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, No. 920093.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/4036
DTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
S45.9 
DOCKET NO!%1@£&-
BRJEF 
\jj\ri\t 3 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
BIRCH CREEK IRRIGATION and 
MARVIN R. MAYERS, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
EARL I. PROTHERO and 
LYNN PROTHERO, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Docket No. 920093 
Priority No. 11 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM THE FINDINGS AND ORDER 
SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
HONORABLE DON V. TIBBS 
Andrew B. Berry, Jr., #0309 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Respondents 
62 West Main Street 
P. O. Box 600 
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600 
Telephone: (801)436-8200 
A. DEAN JEFFS, #1653 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
Attorneys at Law 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
90 North 100 East 
P. O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
MAY 2 7 i 
CLERK SUPREME COURT, 
UTAH 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES . . 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 6 
RELEVANT FACTS 8 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 15 
ARGUMENT 17 
THE FINDING OF CONTEMPT AND JAIL SENTENCE SHOULD 
BE VACATED 17 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO CONTEMPT OF COURT BECAUSE THE 
THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER HAD EXPIRED 18 
POINT II 
THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS FOR A FINDING OF CONTEMPT 
WERE NOT SATISFIED 20 
POINT III 
DEFENDANTS' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED 
BY THE ORDER OF CONTEMPT AND JAIL SENTENCE 23 
n 
PERMANENT INJUNCTION SHOULD BE VACATED 26 
POINT I 
THE ORDER GRANTING A PERMANENT INJUNCTION AND 
MAKING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER PERMANENT 
SHOULD BE VACATED 26 
POINT II 
THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND 
THE FINDINGS AND ORDER DO NOT COMPLY 
WITH UTAH LAW 27 
POINT III 
THE INJUNCTION AS ORDERED IS NOT EQUITABLE 29 
POINT IV 
COMPENSABLE DAMAGES ARE NOT 
IRREPARABLE DAMAGES 31 
CONCLUSION 33 
ADDENDUM 35 
m 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES 
Anderson v. Granite School District. 
17 Utah 2d 405, 407; 413 P.2d 597 (1966) 30 
Arnold Machinery Co. v. Balls. 
624 P.2d 678 (Utah 1981) 4 
Atomic Oil Company of Oklahoma. Inc. v. Bardahl Oil Company. 
419 F.2nd 1097, 1103 (10th Cir. 1969) 27 
Chappell & Co.. Inc. v. Frankel. 
367 F.2nd 197, 203 (1966) 27 
Christensen v. Christensen. 
628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981) 4 
Coleman v. Coleman. 
664 P.2d 1155 (1983) 21 
Doelle v. Bradley. 
784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989) 3 
Faulkner v. Faulkner. 
714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986) 3 
Mees v. Brigham Young University. 
639 P.2d 720 (Utah 1981) 4 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 
752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988) 3 
Reed v. Reed. 
806 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1991) 4 
Schindler v. Schindler. 
776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989) 4 
iv 
Systems Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 
669 P.2d 421 (Utah 1983) 29, 31 
Thomas v. Thomas, 
569 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1977) 21 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 
759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988) 4, 21, 24 
RULES 
Rule 65A(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 4, 28 
Rule 65A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 5, 27, 28, 33 
Rule 6(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 13 
Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 6, 14 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7 6, 25 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV, Section 1 6, 25 
v 
JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction for this Appeal pursuant to 
§78-2-2(3) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
and Article 8, Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Constitution of Utah. 
The Supreme Court may transfer this appeal to the Court of Appeals pursuant to 
§78-2-2(4) and §78-2a-3(2)(j) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended. 
The Utah Supreme Court granted Appellants' Petition For Interlocutory Appeal 
in this matter on the 13th day of April, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
QUESTIONS OF LAW 
The questions of law presented for decision upon appeal are as follows: 
(1) Was it error for the trial court to find Lynn Prothero in contempt and 
sentence him to jail for acts the court determined to have occurred on July 17, 1991, and 
ruled were violations of the Temporary Restraining Order when the record clearly shows 
the 10 day restraining order had expired by its own terms on July 8, 1991. 
(2) Was it error for the court to find contempt and impose sentence where there 
was no specific evidence introduced showing any violation of the Temporary Restraining 
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Order during the 10 day term of the its existence from June 28, 1991, at 11:14 
a.m. to July 8, 1991, at 11:14 a.m.? 
(3) Was it error for the court to find contempt and impose sentence for acts 
occurring after the expiration of the Temporary Restraining Order when no motion, 
stipulation or court order extended the time of the Temporary Restraining Order to cover 
the date of the alleged acts of Lynn Prothero? 
(4) Were the due process rights of Lynn Prothero, under the 14th Amendments 
of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, violated where 
he was given no prior notice, affidavit or order to show cause or a hearing on a charge 
of contempt of court, where the alleged acts did not take place during the effective dates 
of the Temporary Restraining Order and did not take place in the presence of the Judge, 
where there was no specificity of the allegation of violation of the Temporary Restraining 
Order, and where he was given no opportunity to prepare for, respond or to defend 
against the allegation that he violated the court order? 
(5) Did the court obtain jurisdiction to enter an unconditional order of contempt 
where there was no showing of a knowledgeable and willful violation and the order did 
not identify any specific acts of contempt and made no provision for an opportunity for 
Defendant to remedy or purge himself of the alleged contempt? 
(6) Was it error for the court to enter a Permanent Restraining Order before trial 
of the case on its merits? 
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(7) Was it error for the court to grant a Permanent Restraining Order where there 
was no evidence presented showing irreparable injury or injury that could not be 
compensable in damages? 
(8) Was it error for the court to grant an injunction without considering the 
undue burden upon the Defendants of restriction from their former use of the water for 
culinary and stock watering purposes and in light of the trespass and history of 
harassment by Mr. Mayers? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITIES 
All of the foregoing issues for review on this Appeal present questions of law for 
determination by the Appellate Court. Although the Findings and Order appealed from do not 
denominate separately any findings of fact from conclusions of law, using only the generic 
denomination of "Findings and Order", nevertheless, for purposes of this appeal there are very 
limited factual disputes. 
The standard for review (where the appeal as here presented is essentially on the issues 
of law and the interpretation of documents) is that upon review no deference is given to the trial 
court's rulings, conclusions or interpretations and the Appellate Court is free to render its 
independent interpretation and review for correctness. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 
1989); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988); Faulkner 
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v. Faulkner. 714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986); Arnold Machinery Co. v. Balls. 624 P.2d 678 (Utah 
1981). 
The standard for review on the limited issues of fact which may be incidental to this 
appeal is that the Appellate Court will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact unless the 
evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary, the trial court abuses its discretion, the findings 
are unsupported by the record, the evidence is insufficient to support the finding or the findings 
are otherwise clearly erroneous. Christensen v. Christensen. 628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981); 
Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989); Mees v. Brieham Young University. 639 
P.2d 720 (Utah 1981); Reed v. Reed. 806 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1991); Von Hake v. Thomas. 759 
P.2d 1162, at 1172 (Utah 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 65A(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (as applicable to September 1, 1991): 
(b) Temporary restraining order; notice; rehearing duration. No 
temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice to the 
adverse party unless it clearly appears from specific facts shown 
by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and 
irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant 
before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon. Every 
temporary restraining order granted without notice shall be 
endorsed with the date and hour of issuance; and shall be filed 
forthwith in the clerk's office and entered of record; shall define 
the injury and state why it is irreparable and why the order was 
granted without notice; and shall expire by its terms within such 
time after entry, not to exceed 10 days, as the court fixes, unless 
within the time so fixed the order, for good cause shown, is 
extended for a like period or unless the party against whom the 
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order is directed consents that it may be extended for a longer 
period. The reasons for the extension shall be entered of record. 
In case a temporary restraining order is granted without notice, the 
motion for preliminary injunction shall be set down for hearing at 
the earliest possible time and takes precedence of all matters 
except older matters of the same character; and when the motion 
comes on for hearing the party who obtained the temporary 
restraining order shall proceed with the application for a 
preliminary injunction and, if he does not do so, the court shall 
dissolve the temporary restraining order. On 2 days' notice to the 
party who obtained the temporary restraining order without notice 
or on such shorter notice to that party as the court may prescribe, 
the adverse party may appear and move its dissolution or 
modification and in that event the court shall proceed to hear and 
determine such motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice 
require. 
Rule 65A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (effective September 1, 1991): 
(e) Grounds. A restraining order or preliminary injunction may 
issue only upon a showing by the applicant that: 
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the 
order or injunction issues; 
(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs 
whatever damage the proposed order or injunction may cause the 
party restrained or enjoined; 
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be 
adverse to the public interest; and 
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will 
prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents 
serious issues on the merits which should be the subject of further 
litigation. 
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Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration: 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall 
be served upon opposing counsel before being presented to the 
court for signature unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of 
objections shall be submitted to the court and counsel within five 
days after service. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law. 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV, Section 1: 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings. 
This is an interlocutory appeal from Findings and Order rendered by Judge Don 
V. Tibbs in the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Sanpete County, State of Utah in Civil 
No. 9928 entered on the 21st day of November, 1991, in the civil action between Birch Creek 
Irrigation Company and its water master, as Plaintiffs, and two of the company's stockholders, 
Earl and Lynn Prothero, as Defendants. The case involves a dispute over actions of the water 
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master, Marvin R. Mayers, and water rights of the Defendants. On July 31, 1991, the court 
held an evidentiary hearing on the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. At that 
hearing, the court found Lynn Prothero in contempt of court, sentenced him to serve thirty (30) 
days in jail and ruled that Defendants be enjoined. (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991, 
hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 122, Lines 16 - 19; Exhibit "A"). Some 
sixteen weeks later, the trial judge signed the Findings and Order prepared by counsel for the 
Plaintiffs expanding and effectuating those decisions. (Record at 65, Findings and Order; 
Exhibit "B"). 
There has not yet been a trial on the merits of the issues raised by the Complaint of the 
Plaintiffs and the Counterclaim of the Defendants. 
2. Disposition at the Trial Court. 
Counsel for Defendants filed timely objections to the Findings and Order and at 
a hearing on January 22, 1992, when the court's attention was called to the fact that there had 
been no ruling upon those objections, Judge Tibbs announced that he had previously signed the 
Findings and Order. He then ruled "my order stands..." (Record, Trial Setting, Transcript of 
Proceedings, January 22, 1992, Page 4, Line 10; Exhibit "C"). 
The Defendants filed their Petition For Permission to Appeal the Interlocutory 
Order on February 11, 1992, and the Utah Supreme Court granted this appeal as prayed on 
April 13, 1992. 
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RELEVANT FACTS 
On June 27, 1991 Birch Creek Irrigation and Marvin R. Mayers, its current water 
master and a major stockholder in the irrigation company, filed this suit claiming damages and 
seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Defendants, Earl J. 
Prothero and Lynn Prothero (Record at 1, Complaint) The Protheros are stockholders in the 
irrigation company and owners of approximately 40 acres of land entitled to be served with 
water by the irrigation company and upon which are located their residences and livestock. The 
irrigation company owns a small water collection reservoir on land previously taken by 
condemnation from the Protheros. (Record at 50, Order of Immediate Occupancy; Exhibit "D"). 
That pond is surrounded by the Prothero acreage. 
The irrigation company condemnation action to take the land for that small 
reservoir commenced in 1977 at which time the irrigation company obtained a Sixth Judicial 
District Court Order of Immediate Occupancy, Civil No. 7585 (Record at 50, Order of 
Immediate Occupancy; Exhibit "D"). Prior to the commencement of that condemnation action 
Mr. Marvin R. Mayers, who was then, as now, a major stockholder of the Birch Creek 
Irrigation Company (but was not then its water master) trespassed upon the Prothero land, cut 
gate chains and removed a lock, left the gate open allowing Prothero stock to go free and 
threatened Earl Prothero that he, Mayers, was going to force a right-of-way into and across the 
Prothero property (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991 hearing on Motion For Preliminary 
Injunction, Pages 52 -56). Evidence of those trespass incidents by Mr. Mayers was presented 
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to the court at the 1977 hearing on the irrigation company's Motion for Immediate Occupancy. 
The Court granted the order for immediate occupancy in that 1977 action, but as part of the 
Order prohibited Mr. Mayers from going upon or working on the Prothero property. The 
Court's minute entry states, "Mr. Mayers is not to work on or go on this propertyM (Record at 
52, Minute Entry; Exhibit ME") and the Order of Immediate Occupancy specifically prohibited 
the Birch Creek Irrigation Company from permitting or bringing Mr. Mayers to the property 
(Record at 51, Order of Immediate Occupancy; Exhibit "D"). The Protheros were present at 
the hearing, heard the Judge's ruling, and later obtained a copy of that minute entry. (Record, 
Transcript of July 31, 1991 hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 17, Lines 14 -
16) 
In that former action, the irrigation company later obtained a condemnation order 
for taking the land for the pond and an easement in August of 1979. They built the small 
reservoir which is enclosed by the remaining Prothero acreage and is near their homes. Since 
that time up until the summer of 1991, the company's water masters have been persons other 
than Marvin R. Mayers (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991 hearing on Motion For Preliminary 
Injunction, Page 5, Lines 13 to 16; Page 45, Line 11 through Page 46, Line 22). 
In April 1991 the irrigation company announced to its stockholders that it was 
considering hiring Mr. Mayers to be the water master. The Protheros submitted to the company 
a written objection to that action because of their historical problems with Mr. Mayers (Record, 
Transcript of July 31, 1991 hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 46, Lines 6 -
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15). Nevertheless, the irrigation company employed Mr. Mayers as its water master for that 
summer. On June 9, 1991 Mr. Mayers drove his pickup truck through the Prothero gate and 
onto their property. When he failed to leave upon request from Lynn Prothero and was 
traversing the Prothero property on foot to the reservoir site, Lynn Prothero took the ignition 
keys and coil wire from the Mayers truck. When Mr. Mayers returned from the pond, Lynn 
Prothero told him what he had done and refused to return them to him. He told Mr. Mayers 
he had no right to be upon the Prothero property (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991 hearing 
on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 17, Line 10 - Page 19, Line 10). The prior 
trespass and harassment activities of Mr. Mayers on the Prothero property caused Lynn Prothero 
concern for his father, Earl Prothero's health because of an existing heart condition. (Record, 
Transcript of July 31, 1991 hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 34, Lines 16 -
19). He showed him a copy of the minute entry from the condemnation action (Record at 52, 
Minute Entry, Exhibit "E") and stated he was impounding the truck as evidence that Mr. Mayers 
was violating that Court order (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991, hearing on Motion For 
Preliminary Injunction, Page 17, Lines 20 - 23). On June 10, 1991 Mr. Mayers returned to 
Protheros' gate with another stockholder, Mr. Earl Hobby, who was allowed to inspect the 
pond, but Lynn Prothero again told Mr. Mayers not to come on their property. (Record, 
Transcript of July 31, 1991, hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 23, Lines 21 -
22). 
On June 27, 1991 Birch Creek Irrigation and Marvin R. Mayers filed this action 
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claiming very substantial damages (Record at 1, Complaint). On that same date Plaintiffs filed 
a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Record at 24, Motion 
For Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction). On June 28, 1991 Judge Louis 
G. Tervort signed a Temporary Restraining Order and order for the sheriff to take possession 
of the truck (Record at 31, Temporary Restraining Order and Order; Exhibit "F"). This was 
served upon Earl Prothero June 29, 1991 at which time the truck was returned to Mr. Mayers 
(Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991 hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 25). 
That Temporary Restraining Order expired by its own terms 10 days after it was issued, namely 
July 8, 1991 at 11:14 a.m. (Record at 29, Temporary Restraining Order and Order; Exhibit 
On July 17, 1991 Mr. Mayers again came to the Prothero property and Lynn 
Prothero pointed out that the Plaintiffs' Temporary Restraining Order had expired and told him 
not to come onto the property. Lynn offered to check the pond for Mr. Mayers who accepted 
the offer. After going to the pond, he reported to Mr. Mayers that the water level was low and 
Mr. Mayers left (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991 hearing on Motion For Preliminary 
Injunction, Page 115, Line 22 - Page 117, Line 7). 
On July 29, 1991 counsel for the Protheros filed their Answer and Counterclaim 
on their behalf claiming they had sustained substantial damages from the acts of both the water 
company and Marvin R. Mayers as its water master (Record at 39, Answer and Counterclaim). 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction came on for hearing before Judge Don V. Tibbs 
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on July 31, 1991 on a Stipulation and Order for postponement of the original hearing date 
(Record at 37, Stipulation For Continuance, and Record at 38, Order; Exhibits "G" and "H"). 
The Temporary Restraining Order was not extended (Record at 38, Order; Exhibit "H"). 
Testimony of five witnesses was taken, including the Protheros and Mr. Mayers. At the 
conclusion of the testimony Judge Tibbs ruled from the bench against the Protheros and stated, 
among other things, as follows: 
I find that they violated the temporary restraining order by 
the actions on what Lynn Prothero did by his actions on July 17th. 
I find him in contempt of Court and sentence him to 30 days in 
jail. I'll hold up putting him in jail until the next hearing of the 
Court; but I'll reserve a right to do so upon this Court being 
advised of any further interference with the Water Master; ... 
Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991 hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 122, 
Lines 16 - 22; Exhibit "A". 
In September 1991 the Protheros' attorney, Mr. Dale M. Dorius, who had 
represented them up to that point in this case, withdrew as counsel and on September 20, 1991 
the undersigned, A. Dean Jeffs, filed his appearance in the action (Record at 61, Motion For 
Withdrawal of Counsel and Order, and Record at 63, Appearance of Counsel). The Protheros 
had previously ordered from the court reporter a transcript of the July 31, 1991 proceeding and 
upon entry in the case the undersigned attorney sent the reporter his own urgent written request 
for the transcript to be prepared (Record at 72, Letter, Request For Transcript). 
On November 20, 1991, Mr. Berry mailed notice of what he denominated "Notice 
of Entry of Findings and Order" (Record at 68, Notice of Entry of Findings and Order; Exhibit 
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"I") along with a copy of the proposed Findings and Order (Record at 65, Findings and Order; 
Exhibit "B"). These were received by Defendants' counsel November 21, 1991 and the notice 
specified that that "shall be entered as proposed unless you file objections thereto within five (5) 
days of receipt of this notice to you" (emphasis added). 
The next day, on November 22, 1991, the undersigned mailed a Motion for 
Extension of Time to File Objections to Plaintiffs Proposed Findings and Order advising the 
Court that the undersigned was not counsel in the case at the time of the July 31st hearing and 
that a copy of the transcript of that hearing had been ordered but not yet received (Record at 70 
and 72, Motion For Extension of Time to File Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings and 
Order). On December 12, 1991 Judge Tibbs signed an order granting the Motion extending the 
time for objections to be filed "within 30 days." (Record at 73, Order; Exhibit "J"). The 
original and copy of that Order was mailed to the office of the undersigned counsel after it was 
executed. When counsel's secretary telephoned Carole B. Mellor, the Judge's Court Executive, 
to determine why the original was mailed back to counsel after it was executed she was told it 
was so the undersigned counsel could prepare the Certificate of Mailing for filing with the 
clerk's office and forwarding to opposing counsel. (Record at 73, Order, and Record at 74, 
Mailing Certificate). Since the Order was served upon the office of the undersigned by mail and 
filed by mail the time for filing was extended to January 14, 1992 under Rule 6(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings and Order 
was filed on January 14, 1992 (Record at 75, Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed 
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Findings and Order). 
On January 22, 1992 at a hearing for the purpose of setting a trial date, the 
undersigned pointed out to the Court that the Court had not yet ruled on Defendants' Objections 
to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings and Order relating to the July 31, 1991 hearing on the 
preliminary injunction. Judge Tibbs announced that he had signed the proposed Findings and 
Order before receiving Defendants' objections thereto. He then ruled that the Findings and 
Order would stand as signed (Record, Trial Setting, Transcript of Proceedings, Page 4, Line 10; 
Record at 90, Clerk Minute Entry; Exhibit "K"). A review of the court file by the undersigned 
done immediately after that hearing disclosed to the Defendants' counsel for the first time that 
Judge Tibbs had actually signed Plaintiffs' proposed Findings and Order on November 21, 1991, 
the same day they and the notice relating to them were received by the undersigned Defendants' 
counsel and before expiration of the five (5) days for filing objections as provided in the notice 
(Record at 68, Notice of Entry of Findings and Order; Exhibit "I") as well as under Rule 4-
504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. This was done without any notice to 
Defendants' counsel. 
The next day, January 23, 1992, after learning the Judge had signed the Findings 
and Order before notice to counsel, the undersigned submitted to the Court two alternate 
proposed orders, one denying Defendants' objections to the proposed Findings and Order and 
the other granting the objections. This was because Judge Tibbs had executed the Findings and 
Order before the time given Appellants to object to them and without ruling on the objections. 
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No action was taken on either of the said alternate orders and the Petition For Permission to 
Appeal Interlocutory Order was filed in this Court February 11, 1992. 
On March 30, 1992, after counsel for Defendants filed the Petition For Permission 
to Appeal Interlocutory Order Judge Tibbs held a hearing for argument on Defendants' 
objections to the "Findings and Order". Although the Judge stated at that hearing he would set 
aside the contempt provisions of the Order he stated he would leave the balance of the Order in 
effect. (Record at 101, Clerk Minute Entry). No modification or setting aside of any of the 
"Findings and Order" has been entered leaving them in tact and the Temporary Restraining 
Order prohibitions in effect including the prohibition against use of water for culinary purposes. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Contempt of Court: 
The trial court committed significant prejudicial error violative of Defendants rights and 
jeopardizing a fair trial on the merits by finding Lynn Prothero in contempt of court and 
sentencing him to serve 30 days in jail which should be reversed by this Court. 
Point I: 
The trial court ruling that actions of Lynn Prothero on July 17, 1991 were done in 
contempt of court as a violation of a previously issued Temporary Restraining Order was in 
error because the Temporary Restraining Order had expired by its own provisions on July 8, 
1991; there was no evidence introduced showing any violation of the order during its applicable 
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time from June 28, 1991 to July 8, 1991, and there was no extension of the time of its 
application. 
Point II: 
The elements necessary to a finding of contempt of court of knowledge of what the judge 
would require and willfully and knowingly refusing to comply were not present in this case. 
There was no evidence to contradict the fact that on July 17, 1991, Lynn Prothero knew the 
Temporary Restraining Order had expired and reasonably believed a prior order of the court 
prohibiting Mr. Mayers from coming upon the Prothero land applied. Not only is there no 
evidence of a violation of the order during the time of its legal existence, there was no showing 
of a knowing and willful failure to comply after it expired. 
Point III: 
The due process rights of Lynn Prothero were violated by the court ruling from the bench 
and later signing the order of contempt and jail sentence on allegations of acts not committed 
in presence of the court without advanced notice, without being advised of the nature of the 
action to be taken against him, without a hearing on the allegation and without a proper 
opportunity to defend against the allegation. 
Permanent Injunction: 
It was error for the court to make and enter a permanent injunction prior to trial. 
Point I: 
A permanent injunction should be issued only after a full trial on the merits on the broad 
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issues that are the subject of the litigation. 
Point II: 
The Plaintiffs failed to meet the Utah law requirement of a showing of irreparable injury, 
loss or damage for granting injunctive relief. 
Point III: 
The court failed to consider the need to balance the equities between the parties by failing 
to consider the hardship being imposed upon the Defendants by entry of the injunctive relief.' 
The irrigation company could have, at little or no expense to it, resolved the problem of Mr. 
Mayers entries upon the Prothero property by merely designating some other person to cross the 
Prothero land to inspect and regulate the water flow of their pond. 
ARGUMENT 
THE FINDING OF CONTEMPT AND JAIL SENTENCE SHOULD BE VACATED 
Significant prejudicial error that violated the rights of Defendants resulted from Judge 
Tibbs' ruling that: 
I find that they violated the Temporary Restraining Order by the 
actions on what Lynn Prothero did by his actions on July 17. I 
find him in contempt of court and sentence him to 30 days in 
jail... 
Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991, hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 122, 
Lines 16 - 19; Exhibit "A". 
The Judge's later execution of the Findings and Order effectuating that ruling and making 
permanent a Temporary Restraining Order which included the prohibition of use of water for 
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culinary purposes, violated due process. If not corrected before trial these errors'will jeopardize 
the Defendants' right to a fair and proper trial not only on their defenses to the Complaint but 
also on their own counterclaims including their claim to culinary and stock water as filed against 
the Plaintiffs in this action. 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO CONTEMPT OF COURT BECAUSE THE 
THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER HAD EXPIRED 
In the instant case the Temporary Restraining Order that Defendant, Lynn Prothero, has 
by order of the trial court been held to have contemptuously violated was a 10 day order issued 
by Judge Louis G. Tervort at the outset of the action on June 28, 1991, at 11:14 a.m. That 
Order specifically provided: "This Restraining Order shall automatically expire on the 8th day 
of July 8, 1991, at the hour of 11:14 a.m." (Record at 31, Temporary Restraining Order and 
Order; Exhibit "F"). 
For the court to find that Lynn Prothero violated the Temporary Restraining Order there 
must be evidence showing that he did so between its effective date of June 28, 1991, at 11:14 
a.m. and July 8, 1991, at 11:14 a.m. when the Temporary Restraining Order expired. 
A review of the Transcript of the testimony in the July 31, 1991 hearing at the conclusion 
of which Judge Tibbs made his ruling, reveals that there was no testimony relating to any actions 
by Lynn Prothero in violation of the Temporary Restraining Order during the time it was 
applicable. No evidence was introduced of any alleged violations of the Temporary Restraining 
Order during the period from June 28, 1991, through July 8, 1991. Contrary to Judge Tibbs' 
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ruling, Lynn Prothero's actions on July 17, 1991, could not have been done in contempt of court 
because there was no Restraining Order to violate on that date. Furthermore, the record is clear 
that Lynn Prothero knew when it expired and that there was no willful and knowledgeable failure 
or refusal to obey it even on the date of July 17, 1991 (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991 
hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 116, Lines 9 - 11). There is in the record 
no evidence that Lynn Prothero violated the provisions of the Temporary Restraining Order or 
that he failed to comply with it during its legal existence. 
The time covered by the Temporary Restraining Order was not extended. Rule 65A of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as it was in force at the time of the signing of the Temporary 
Restraining Order, at subparagraph (b) provides as follows: 
Every temporary restraining order ... shall expire by its terms 
within such time after entry, not to exceed 10 days, as the court 
fixes, unless within the time so fixed the order, for good cause 
shown, is extended for a like period or unless the party against 
whom the order is directed consents that it may be extended for a 
longer period ... (Emphasis added). 
In this action there was no motion, application or stipulation to extend the Temporary 
Restraining Order within the time fixed by the Order as required by Rule 65A. There is in the 
court file a Stipulation and an Order dated July 17, 1991 (nine days after the expiration of the 
Temporary Restraining Order) extending the time for a hearing on Plaintiffs' sought after 
preliminary injunction (Record at 37, Stipulation For Continuance and Record at 37, Order; 
Exhibits "G" and "H"). But, that stipulation and the order postponing the date for the hearing 
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by their very terms made clear that the postponement applied to a hearing on the "Motion For 
Preliminary Injunction" not to the already expired Temporary Restraining Order. No reference 
is made to the Temporary Restraining Order in either the Stipulation or the Order and they do 
not purport to extend the time or application of the Temporary Restraining Order. Furthermore, 
by July 17, 1991, the date of the said Stipulation and order, the earlier Temporary Restraining 
Order had already expired by its own terms. It could not have been extended on July 17th since 
Rule 65 A requires that any extension of a Temporary Restraining Order must be accomplished 
during the term of the original Temporary Restraining Order. Nevertheless, the Defendants did 
not consent to any extension of the Temporary Restraining Order and the record is clear that it 
was not extended. 
POINT II 
THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS FOR A FINDING OF CONTEMPT 
WERE NOT SATISFIED 
Even if the Temporary Restraining Order had not expired before July 17, 1991, the 
substantive elements of contempt of court were not proven and do not exist in this case. This 
Court set forth the necessary elements for a finding of contempt as they applied in a case 
involving failure to comply with court orders in Von Hake v. Thomas in which it stated: 
As a general rule, in order to prove contempt for failure to comply 
with a court order it must be shown that the person cited for 
contempt knew what was required, had the ability to comply, and 
intentionally failed or refused to do so... These three elements 
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal contempt 
proceeding, ... and by clear and convincing evidence in a civil 
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contempt proceeding. 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988) 
This Court in the earlier case of Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Utah 1977) 
pointed out that findings of contempt and sentencing to jail are very serious consequences to the 
person involved, stated that contempt must be shown by clear and convincing proof and itemized 
those essential elements as: 
(1) the party knew what was required of him; 
(2) that he had the ability to comply; and 
(3) that he willfully and knowingly failed and refused to do so. 
The court reaffirmed the elements of this rule in Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155 at 1156 
(1983). 
The record in this case clearly verifies that the elements No. 1 and No. 3 of the rule did 
not exist here. 
The only testimony relating to actions by Lynn Prothero after the issuance of the 
Temporary Restraining Order describe a specific incident on July 17, 1991, nine days after the 
expiration of the Temporary Restraining Order. The evidence of the activity on that date was 
that Lynn Prothero objected to Mr. Marvin R. Mayers' effort to go across the Prothero property 
because he (Lynn Prothero) believed he had a prior and continuing order of this court in the 
previous condemnation action that prohibited Mr. Mayers from going upon the premises 
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(Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991, hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 116, 
Line 6). 
The record does not support that Lynn Prothero knew or should have known that if on 
July 17, 1991, he told Mr. Mayers he should not come upon the Prothero property he would be 
considered by Judge Tibbs to be violating a court order. Even the testimony of Mr. Mayers at 
the hearing confirms Lynn Prothero's understanding that the Temporary Restraining Order had 
expired (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991, hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, 
Page 116, Lines 9 - 1 1 ) . Not only had the Temporary Restraining Order expired by its own 
terms, as pointed out under Point I above, but Lynn Prothero reasonably believed that the 
Temporary Restraining Order was no longer in force on July 17, 1991. Furthermore, on that 
date Lynn Prothero had no reason to think that a court would at a later date consider his actions 
a violation of an expired Temporary Restraining Order. 
Even if the Temporary Restraining Order had been in force on July 17, 1991 the 
uncontroverted evidence that Lynn Prothero was relying upon the earlier order of this Court 
which he understood prohibited Mr. Mayers from coming upon his property and his belief that 
the Temporary Restraining Order against the Protheros had expired, would clearly negate any 
claims that he "wilfully and knowingly failed and refused" to comply with an order of the Court. 
Lynn Prothero's actions on July 17, 1991, could not be construed as done in contempt 
of the trial court's Temporary Restraining Order, not only because there was no Restraining 
Order on July 17, 1991, for him to violate but also because his actions on that date demonstrate 
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that there was no willful and knowledgeable failure or refusal to obey a court order or to harm 
the irrigation company. The transcript of the testimony discloses that on July 17, 1991, when 
Marvin P. Mayers went upon the Prothero property Lynn Prothero met him and reminded him 
that the Temporary Restraining Order had expired and told Mr. Mayers that he was not to come 
upon their property. When Mr. Mayers wanted to check the water level of the pond Lynn 
offered to do it for him and Mr. Mayers accepted the offer. After Lynn inspected the pond he 
reported that the water level was low, Mr. Mayers left (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991, 
hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 115, Line 22 through Page 117, Line 7). 
While he believed he had the right under the prior court order to keep Mr. Mayers off his land, 
this clearly demonstrated his willingness to assist the irrigation company to know the status of 
its pond. 
Not only is there no record in the proceedings of Lynn Prothero violating the Temporary 
Restraining Order during its legal existence, there is no evidence that he knowingly or willfully 
refused or failed to comply with it. The findings of contempt and the 30 day jail sentence were 
done in error, still hang as a dark cloud over the future proceeding in this case, and should be 
ordered vacated by this Court. 
POINT HI 
DEFENDANTS' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED 
BY THE ORDER OF CONTEMPT AND JAIL SENTENCE 
In Von Hake, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
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Indirect contempt [contempt occurring outside the presence of the 
court], in contrast to direct contempt, can properly be adjudged 
only in a proceeding more tightly hedged about with procedural 
protections. The due process provision of the Federal Constitution 
requires that in a prosecution for a contempt not committed in the 
presence of the court, "the person charged be advised of the nature 
of the action against him [or her], have assistance of counsel, if 
requested, have the right to confront witnesses, and have the right 
to offer testimony on his [or her] behalf." [Citations omitted] 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1170 (Utah 1988). 
The Motion before the court on July 31, 1991, was Plaintiffs' Motion For Preliminary 
Injunction. Defendant had no notice that the proceedings would also involve a hearing for or 
any allegation of contempt of court for violation of the Temporary Restraining Order issued June 
28, 1991. There was no advance notice. 
There is no mention or allegation of a violation of the Temporary Restraining Order until 
near the conclusion of the hearing on July 31, 1991, when Mr. Berry, counsel for Mr. Mayers, 
asked Mr. Mayers if there had been any violations of the Temporary Restraining Order. Mr. 
Mayers answered that it was his view that when Lynn Prothero told him on July 17, 1991, not 
to cross the Prothero property, that this was a violation. The only other mention of a violation 
of the Order was Judge Tibbs' statement at the conclusion of the hearing that he found Lynn 
Prothero to have violated it by his actions on July 17, 1991 (Record, Transcript of July 31, 
1991, hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 115 Line 10 through Page 117 Line 
12). There was no other notice, no order to show cause, no setting of a hearing, and no entry 
of any charge to prepare Lynn Prothero or his counsel to deal with an allegation of any supposed 
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violation of the Temporary Restraining Order. Certainly the mere self-serving questioning by 
his own counsel of one of the Plaintiffs near the end of the hearing did not give the court 
jurisdiction to rule and make a finding a few minutes later, at the conclusion of the hearing, that 
Lynn Prothero was in contempt of court and to sentencing him to serve 30 days in jail. 
Defendant was not in any way "advised of the nature of the action against him". Neither 
the court nor counsel implied or expressed in advance that Defendant had been or would be 
charged with contempt of court. Defendant's first notice of the charge came at the moment in 
which he was found guilty of it (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991, hearing on Motion For 
Preliminary Injunction, Page 122, Lines 18 - 19; Exhibit "A"). Such notice does not qualify 
as notice at all, and such lack of notice clearly violates the due process rights of Defendants. 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. Because Lynn Prothero was not aware 
that he had been or would be charged with a contempt of court in that very proceeding he was 
not able to confront witnesses on the issue of contempt, was unable to prepare a defense on the 
issue of contempt, was not given time to produce witnesses, and was not given a proper 
opportunity to defend against the allegation. In short, Defendant was found guilty of contempt 
of court by the trial court without being afforded the opportunity to prove his innocence. The 
court's ruling came as a stunning surprise to the Defendants and their counsel. Such procedure 
clearly violates the Utah Supreme Court's admonition that "indirect contempt, ... can properly 
be adjudged only in a proceeding more tightly hedged about with procedural protections. Id. 
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PERMANENT INJUNCTION SHOULD BE VACATED 
POINT I 
THE ORDER GRANTING A PERMANENT INJUNCTION AND MAKING 
THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER PERMANENT SHOULD BE VACATED 
The matters ruled on by the court in making and entering the permanent injunction 
encompass the very issues to be litigated in this action when it goes to trial on the merits and 
were unnecessary in advance of trial. Although when ruling from the bench Judge Tibbs 
ordered "that the Protheros shall not take water from the irrigation company now, except under 
direction of the water master ...", he did not state the Temporary Restraining Order would be 
made permanent. However, some sixteen weeks later when he signed the "Findings and Order" 
without any further hearing he specifically made the Temporary Restraining Order permanent 
even though there has not yet been a trial of this case on the merits. The "Findings and Order" 
states: 
The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore entered herein and 
served upon the Defendants is hereby made permanent and is 
incorporated as though fully set forth herein; ... 
(Record at 67, Paragraph 12, Findings and Order; Exhibit "B"). 
It is unusual and an abuse of discretion for the trial court to enter and make permanent 
an order for injunctive relief prior to trial on the merits. To make a previously expired 
temporary restraining order permanent prior to a trial of the case on the merits is even more 
extreme. 
A permanent injunction should issue only after a full trial on the merits at which all of 
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the elements essential to the granting of injunctive relief have been resolved in favor of the party 
seeking that relief. Atomic Oil Company of Oklahoma. Inc. v. Bardahl Oil Company, 419 
F.2nd 1097, 1103 (10th Cir. 1969); Chappell & Co.. Inc. v. Frankel. 367 F.2nd 197, 203 
(1966). 
Mr. Marvin R. Mayers' truck, which Lynn Prothero had detained upon the Prothero land 
had already been returned to him before the evidentiary hearing on the Motion For Preliminary 
Injunction was held on July 31, 1991. The Prothero's made it clear by their testimony that, 
although they objected to Mr. Mayers coming upon their property because of his prior violations 
of their rights and they believed they had a right to make that objection based upon a prior court 
order, they were perfectly willing to allow any person other than Mr. Mayers to come to or 
cross their property on behalf of the water company (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991, 
hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 46). The pleadings demonstrate that 
various rights of the parties relating to the injunction are the subject of the dispute. The 
imposing of the permanent injunctive relief ordered by the court before hearing the whole case 
on its merits is not justified. 
POINT II 
THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND 
THE FINDINGS AND ORDER DO NOT COMPLY WITH UTAH LAW 
The Utah Rule of Civil Procedure applicable to the granting of Temporary Restraining 
Orders and Preliminary Injunctions, Rule 65A, was modified effective September 1, 1991. The 
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Temporary Restraining Order in this case was filed July 3, 1991, prior to the changes, (Record 
at 29, Temporary Restraining Order and Order; Exhibit "F") and the Findings and Order were 
executed and filed after the change (Record at 67, Paragraph 12, Findings and Order; Exhibit 
"B") neither of them met the applicable statutory requirements in effect at the time they were 
executed by the court. 
The former language of Rule 65 A(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relating to the 
granting of a Temporary Restraining Order required that: 
Every temporary restraining order ... shall define the injury and 
state why it is irreparable ... (Emphasis added.) 
The Temporary Restraining Order of Judge Tervort, which Judge Tibbs made permanent, 
did not do that (Record at 29, Temporary Restraining Order and Order; Exhibit "F"). It does 
state in its final paragraph at Page 31 "that irreparable injury, loss and damage would be 
suffered by Plaintiff..." It says no more than that on the subject. That language clearly does 
not define the injury or state why it would be irreparable. Therefore, the original Temporary 
Restraining Order failed to meet the requirements set forth in that Rule. 
The language of Rule 65A(e) which applied on November 21, 1991, when Judge Tibbs 
executed the "Findings and Order" is as follows: 
(e) Grounds. A restraining order or preliminary injunction may 
issue only upon a showing by the applicant that: 
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the 
order or injunction issues; 
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(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs 
whatever damage the proposed order or injunction may cause the 
party restrained or enjoined; 
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be 
adverse to the public interest; and 
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will 
prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents 
serious issues on the merits which should be subject of further 
litigation. 
A careful review of the record makes it clear that Plaintiffs made no showing, either by 
affidavit or evidence at the hearing, that they would suffer irreparable harm unless the order or 
injunction were issued as required by subparagraph (1). Moreover, they did not show, nor even 
attempt to show and the judge did not take into consideration that the supposed threatened injury 
to Plaintiffs outweigh whatever damage the injunction may cause to the Defendants as required 
by subparagraph (2). 
POINT III 
THE INJUNCTION AS ORDERED IS NOT EQUITABLE 
In Systems Concepts. Inc. v. Dixon the Supreme Court expressed the caution with which 
a trial court should consider and evaluate a request for an injunction, wherein it said: 
Injunction, being an extraordinary remedy, should not be lightly 
granted ... the discretion of the court should be exercised within 
the purview of sound equitable principles, taking into account all 
the facts and circumstances of the case. 
Systems Concepts. Inc. v. Dixon. 669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1983). 
This Supreme Court has also said: "Injunctive relief... is an instrument of equity to be 
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invoked where the party has no adequate legal remedy." Anderson v. Granite School District, 
17 Utah 2d 405, 407; 413 P.2d 597 (1966). 
The Temporary Restraining Order imposed hardship on the Prothero's by prohibiting 
them from continuing to use any water for culinary purposes (Records at 29, Temporary 
Restraining Order and Order; Exhibit "F") even though the testimony at the hearing confirmed 
that their own filtering and chiorination system was adequate (Record, Transcript of July 31, 
1991, hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 28, Lines 13 - 15). Making it 
permanent has further extended that hardship. 
Furthermore, the Findings and Order were onerously broad in subjecting the Protheros 
to the specific control of Mr. Mayers as to all their use of water in spite of his history of 
disregard for the property and rights of the Protheros. The Findings and Order state in 
Paragraph 9 as follows: 
The Defendants shall not take or use water except under the 
direction and with the express permission of the water master of 
Birch Creek Irrigation Company; ... 
Record at 67, Paragraph 9, Findings and Order; Exhibit "B". 
The right of the Defendants to use water for culinary and stock watering purposes is a 
long standing usage and one of the issues to be litigated in the trial of this case on the merits 
(Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991, hearing on Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Page 27, 
Lines 2 - 5 ; Page 112, Lines 9 - 13). The Affidavit of Mr. Mayers that was used to obtain the 
Temporary Restraining Order and his testimony at trial demonstrate his refusal to recognize that 
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claim of right in the Protheros (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991, hearing on Motion For 
Preliminary Injunction, Page 112, Lines 9 - 13, and Record at 21, Affidavit of Water Master 
Marvin R. Mayers) and the Findings and Order requiring the water master's specific permission 
for use of water has interrupted and continues to interrupt that long established usage, even 
though the trial court has not yet heard their evidence substantiating that water right. Thereby 
the trial court, by the order, delegated to the water master control and the power to prohibit the 
Prothero's culinary water usage which is an issue yet to be litigated in the action. 
POINT IV 
COMPENSABLE DAMAGES ARE NOT IRREPARABLE DAMAGES 
In the Systems Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon case, the Supreme Court of Utah said: 
The second ground for injunctive relief (irreparable harm) is 
generally considered the most important. If the moving party is 
unable to show "that the commission or continuance of some act 
during the litigation would produce great or irreparable injury, ... 
the motion for injunction will usually be denied, notwithstanding 
a showing of probable right or entitlement to recovery at law. 
Irreparable injury, in the injunctive relief context, has been defined 
as follows: 
Wrongs of repeated and continuing character, or which occasion 
damages that are estimated only by conjecture, and not by any 
accurate standard, are included ... "Irreparable injury" justifying 
an injunction is that which cannot be adequately compensated in 
damages or for which damages cannot be compensable in money. 
Systems Concepts. Inc. v. Dixon. 669 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1983) (Emphasis added). 
The Plaintiff, Birch Creek Irrigation, by very simple and inexpensive action, can avoid 
any problem in serving its need to cross Defendants' property. It is clear, and the company 
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officers were aware, that if they would send any person other than Marvin R. Mayers to inspect 
or regulate their pond, the Protheros would have no objections and there would be no 
confrontations (Record, Transcript of July 31, 1991 hearing on Motion For Preliminary 
Injunction, Page 46). It was Marvin R. Mayers that created the problem that gave rise to this 
litigation by his former trespasses, his violations of the property rights of the Defendants and 
his threats against him. There seems to be no reasonable reason why the water company could 
not, as they have done in the past, employ someone other than Marvin R. Mayers to do 
whatever required entry upon the property of Defendants. Surely it does not cause irreparable 
harm to the water company to do so and if they claim some damage for it, it is a compensable 
claim and the Protheros are both property owners and owners of water stock in the company 
assuring collectability. 
The record in this case is completely void of any proof of irreparable injury beyond 
unsupported and unexplained statements in the Complaint and the Affidavit of Mr. Mayers that 
immediate and irreparable injury would be suffered by the Plaintiffs if the Temporary 
Restraining Order were not granted (Record at 5, Paragraphs 19 and 20; Record at 7, Paragraph 
27, Complaint). 
Such general and unsupported allegations by Plaintiffs does not constitute a "showing" 
that irreparable injury will result if injunction is not granted. There was no substantiation of that 
flat assertion by any testimony or evidences. Without evidence at the hearing for the 
Preliminary Injunction on the issue of irreparable injury the court only had before it the 
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unsupported general allegations of the Complaint and the Affidavit and therefore no basis for 
a determination of irreparable injury. Even supposing damage to crops or livestock were to be 
incurred, those are items clearly compensable in monetary damages if proven. There was no 
showing of such damages, nor even any assertion that either the irrigation company or Mr. 
Mayers would suffer such damage. Based upon the record it would be mere speculation as to 
damages to other people. The alleged injuries are not the kind of injuries that would justify an 
injunction under Rule 65A(e) and the application of the Rule as it has been applied by this court 
and the evidence does not support granting an injunction. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellate Court should reverse and make void the trial court's Findings and Order 
that held Lynn Prothero in contempt of court and sentenced him to serve 30 days in jail and that 
imposed and made permanent the injunction with its broad and extensive prohibitions and which 
included ordering that Temporary Restraining Order be permanent. 
RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this %7%s of May, 1992. 
^V^£*s^-» 
A. Dean Jeffs of 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 

PAGE 122 
finds that they cannot r^ly upon it nous because Hv-it's 
over; 
The t~our*". finds 'hat the Prnlhero^, boththe 
father and the son, have blocked the right of u>ay belonging 
to the irrigation company; T find they've wrongfully 
interfered with the Water Master's duties; I find that they 
have wrongfully taken the vehicle and they caused the damage 
to Mr. Mayers and to the vrater company. Tfm gonna reserve 
the ruling on the amount of damage until the time of trial; 
I find that they made threats and they assaulted 
the Water Master; 
I find this, that they diverted water without 
right, and the Court reserves jurisdiction to determine the 
damages to the other water users of the company, to the 
irrigation company, and to the Water Master; 
T find that they violated the temporary 
restraining order by the actions on what Lynn Prothero did 
by his actions on duly 17th. I find him in contempt of 
Court and sentence him to 30 days in jail. I'll hold up 
putting him in jail until the next hearing of the Court; but 
I'll reserve a right to do so upon this Court being advised 
of any further interference with the Water Master; 
It's the order of the Court that the Protheros 
shall not take any water from the irrigation company now, 
except under the direction of the Water Master; 
EXHIBIT—Ei 
ANDREW B. BERRY JR. 0903 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
62 West Main Street 
P.O. Box 600 
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600 
Telephone: (801) 4 3 6-8 200 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUI& * 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
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= ;;ANSEN 
7IEFTCOUNTY 
BIRCH CREEK IRRIGATION and 
MARVIN R. MAYERS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EARL J PROTHERO and 
LYNN PROTHERO, 
FINDINGS AND ORDER 
Civil No. 9928 
Assigned to: 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
Defendants. 
ooOoo 
This matter came on for regularly scheduled hearing on 
the Plaintiff's Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction on the 31st day of July, 1991, before the 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Sixth Judicial District Court Judge. The 
Plaintiffs and the Defendants were present and represented by 
their counsel, Andrew B. Berry, Jr., and Dale M. Dorius, 
respectively. The Court, upon the pleadings on file herein, the 
testimony of the parties and their witnesses, the documentary 
evidence admitted and good cause appearing therefore, hereby 
FINDS, ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
1. There was no prior restraint against the Plaintiff, 
Marvin R. Mayers, from coming upon the Defendant's real property 
except during the construction of the pond; 
- Cs-
2. The Defendants blocked the right of way of the 
Plaintiff's upon, over the easement over the Defendant's real 
property and to the pond owned by the Plaintiff, Birch Creek 
Irrigation Company; 
3. The Defendants have wrongfully interferred with the 
Water Master of Birch Creek Irrigation Company, Marvin R. Mayers, 
in the execution of his duties as water master and have 
interferred with the easements, rights of way, real property 
rights and proper functioning of the Plaintiff; 
4. The Defendants wrongfully took possession the motor 
vehicle and personal property of the Plaintiffs and deprived them 
of said property; 
5. The Defendants have made threats of violence 
against the Water Master and physically assaulted him; 
6. The Defendants have taken and converted water of 
the Plaintiff, Birch Creek Irrigation Company, and deprived the 
Plaintiff thereof without right; 
7. The Defendant, Lynn Prothero, has violated the 
Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court by prohibiting 
access to the Plaintiff's water and pond and threatening the 
Plaintiff's Water Master; 
8. The Defendant, Lynn Prothero, by virtue of the 
violation of the Temporary Restraining Order, is in contempt of 
this Court's Order and is sentenced to serve thirty (30), days in 
the Sanpete County Jail. This sentence is stayed until the time 
of trial herein on condition that there are no further violations 
of this Court's Orders; 
fiJO r D 
A, 
9. The Defendant's shall take ^or use-fio-water except 
under the direction and with the express permission of the Water 
Master ot Birch Creek Irrigation Company; 
10. The Plaintiff, Birch Creek Irrigation Company, has 
the sole authority to select and appoint it's Water Master; 
11. The Defendants shall not interfere with the duties 
of the Water Master, the easements of the Plaintiffs nor the 
water and other assets of the Plaintiff's; 
12. The Temporary Restraining Order heretofor entered 
herein and served upon the Defendants is hereby made permanent 
and is incorporated as though fully set forth herein; and 
13. This Court reserves jurisdiction to assess and 
award the Plaintiff's damages and attorney fees incurred as a 
result of the Defendants wrongful actions. 
%/ " day of /i/{jJe s~j h ?^ , 1991 
V O / > y V \ >C^ r& ^ BY THE COURT: 
V v. 
^^^^«<L_g^aM^^^>^ertify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true 
^§^£e($£j: <$k0/o\ _, _, _,_ . 
Dorius ^ '^eSfle'y for Defendants, at P.O. Box U, 29 South Main 
Street, Brigham City, Utah 84302, and to'^^Dean Jeffs, Attorney 
for Plaintiffs ^ ^fajT^O North LOO East^iP.O. Bchc 888, Provo, Utah 
84603, on this /<\J day of// 6/S-^^JCL^I , 1991 
J l , ^ — 
DON V TIBBS, 
ff^\y /*>§ Sixth Judicial Distr ic t Court 
and nf@ £^e(3$£ <%^-/°^ t ^ l e foregoing Findings and Order to Dale M 
EXHIBIT—C:— 
i 
j II fiJp.d on November 21st. a year ^ IUO. 
2 MR. JEFFS: J had not rp.r.v.iK^d a ropy of thai and 
3 there was d^ order extending the lime <mc! J submitted if 
4 within that time. 
5 MR. BF.RRY: J think the objections thai were filed 
6 a r n not wo 11 taken. Mr, Jeffs filed a memorandum indjoatiny 
7 that you couldn't find the Protheros tr\ contempt, but it 
8 seems io me u/e went througli many witnesses with respect to 
9 I] their actions. 
THE COURT: My point is that my order stands. 
U'ftM I try the case and see what happens at that point. 
MR. JFFFS: That being the case. Your Honor, I do 
need time. We had not—^l^ you understand, T was not t))« 
Attornev ttt the time. 
10 
u 
12 
U 
M 
15 || THE COURT: W P . 1 1 . T understand 51. 
}6 MR. -IFFFS: J x 11 need t jme for di sroi-er v. 
17 THE COURT: okay. How 1ony do you need? 
18 MR. .JEFFS: I'd like 120 days. Your Honor. As T 
19 see the witnesses and read the transcript, it seems to me 
20 there's quite a bit needs to be done 
21 THE COURT: Js there any objection? 
22 MR. BERRY: Well, (he water company would like to 
23 yet the case to trial. Of course, If he wants io take 
24 depositions, we'll make our witnesses available. 
25 THE COURT; Well my o r d e r — T remember the case, 

EXHIBIT 
Clark R. Nielsen 
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 521-3350 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
BIRCH CREEK IRRIGATION COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff, ) ORDER OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY 
V. ) 
C i v i l No, 7585 
EARL J . PROTHERO, ) 
D e f e n d a n t , ) 
This matter came on for hearing before the above entitled 
Court on the 2nd day of November, 1977, before the Honorable 
Don V. Tibbs, District Judge; Plaintiff Birch Creek Irrigation 
Company being present and represented by counsel, Clark R. 
Nielsen of Nielsen, Henriod, Gottfredson and Peck; the Defendant 
Earl J. Prothero being present and represented by counsel, M. 
Dayle Jeffs of Jeffs and Jeffs; evidence having been adduced 
by the respective parties and the matter having been argued and 
submitted to the Court and the Court having made and entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that Plaintiff Birch Creek Irrigation Company be permitted and 
is hereby given immediate occupancy of the following described 
premises upon tender to the Clerk of Sanpete County of the sum 
o4. $1,312.50, which amount is 75% of the appraised value of the 
following described property located in Sanpete County, State 
of Utah, sought to be condemned by Plaintiff for the construction 
and maintenance of an irrigation pond and pipeline: 
An easement for a water line along the section line with 
a width of one rod on each side of said section line 
between Sections 18 and 19, Township 14 South, Range 5 
East, Salt Lake Meridian, beginning 1320 feet east of the 
west corner of the sections and east therefrom a distance 
of 880 feet to the point of beginning of the reservoir; 
thence south 130 feet, east 210 feet, north 210 feet, west 
210 feet and south 80 feet to beginning. The area of the 
reservoir is 1.01/ acres. 
EXHIBIT—& 
EXHIBIT n m 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
COUNTY OF SANPETE STATE OF UTAH ^ 
DON V. TIBBS, Judge 
C. Howard Watkin, Court Reporter 
llflta Ndvember 2, 1977 
Case No. ??85 
TITLE (Parties Present) 
BIRCH CREEK IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
V 8 
EARL J, PROTHERO, 
Defendant. 
COUNSEL (Counsel Present): 
Clark R« Nielsen/'..A^ty^fpj^Pef « 
M. Dayle Jeffs, Atty-ftff^Ddf. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Proceedings Before the Court 
MOTION OF PLAINTIFF FOR IMMEDIATE 
OCCUPANCY 
( ) DIVORCE 
( ) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
( ) SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
( ) PROBATE 
i ) CRIMINAL 
( ) ADOPTION 
( X) OTHER 
Br. Nielsen filed Affidavit and an Appraisal with Court. Mr. Jeffs 
objects to Motion and requests necessity. Mr. Clark Nielsen gave 
opening statement briefing the court on this matter. Mr, Jeffs also 
made statements. Plf. Exhibit #1 Minutes of Board of Directors1 
Meeting Oct. 5f 1977 offerred and received in evidence. Condemnation 
Resolution, Exhibit A Is Attached to Complaint. Copy of Condemnation 
ftgsnliitlon Fvhi.hifr £? received in pvidence. Mr. Dayle Jeffs cross-
pxamtned. Mr. George Collflrri called to witness atand by Mr« Jeffs 
as an adverse witness. Mr. Earl J. Prothero, defendant, sworn in and 
testified. Mr. Nielsen cross-examined. Counsel made their arguments. 
Cc1 rt finds thc-re is a necessity and Order of Immediate Occupancy is 
• / • _ _ _ _ _ _ — . — _ — . — _ _ _ _ _ _ — . 
granted on the 1 acre and the 2 rods, one on each side of Section 18 
and 19. $1,312.50 should b^ paid down at this time being 75% of value. 
The Birch Creek Irrigation Company is to construct a chalnlink fence 
around pond. If>*. Mayors is not to work or go on this property. Immediate 
uccupancy can be taken upon Tenure of $1,312.50. 
/ . ,s . , V£t^-c AJA 
Court Clerk Don V. Tibbs, District Judge 
- 103 
I EXHi6iT-£— 
I ™__„ I 
ANDREW B . BERRY, J R . 0309
 n L E D 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f s
 r , ( r r T - - .-MJ-JTY UTAH 
62 West Main S t r e e t CA1 -
P . O . Box 600 - .- • M Q PR 4 T l 
M o r o n i , U tah 84646-0600 Dl ^ L o i n 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 436-8200 _ ( _ , „ . n.cyiMlSEM 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DIS^CT^COTRTJTOl&EWJWETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
BIRCH CREEK IRRIGATION and 
MARVIN R. MAYERS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EARL J. PROTHERO and 
LYNN PROTHERO, 
Defendants. 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
AND ORDER 
Civil No. 
Assigned to: 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
ooOoo 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
Based upon Plaintiff's Complaint, Affidavit of the 
Plaintiff, Marvin R. Mayers, and the Water Master of the 
Plaintiff and Motion for Order and Temporary Restraining Order, 
and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The Defendants, Earl J. Prothero and Lynn 
Prothero, are temporarily restrained, enjoined and prohibited 
from in any manner interfering with the duties of the Water 
Master, diverting water to their own use without authorization, 
using irrigation water as cullinary water, opening and closing 
water gates and lines without authorization, digging ditches and 
creating other barriers to prevent ingress and egress to the 
water company ponds, ditches and lines and otherwise interfering 
^ * / y. Served to: ^ ^ & - Fil^rA-elfi / yf ^ervea 10: . t - ^ ^ ^ ' '^?K7'HK.fl
F 
J^t A 
with the easements and rights of way of the Plaintiff, Birch 
Creek Irrigation Company; 
2. The Defendants, Earl J. Prothero and Lynn 
Prothero, are temporarily restrained, enjoined and prohibited 
from harrassing, annoying, injuring, threatening, striking and 
assaulting the Water Master and other Birch Creek Irrigation 
Company employees and preventing the water company and Water 
Master from servicing the ponds, lines and ditches and 
preventing ingress and egress to, from and upon the real 
property of the Defendants; 
3. The Defendants, Earl J. Prothero and Lynn 
Prothero, are temporarily restrained, enjoined and prohibited 
from and against damaging the motor vehicle, keys, tools and 
other personal property of the Plaintiffs; 
4. The Sheriff of Sanpete County is ordered to take 
possession of said Plaintiff's motor vehicle, keys, tools and 
other personal property immediately and deliver the said 
property to the Plaintiffs until a hearing may be held upon the 
Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction; and 
5. The Defendants are ordered to forthwith cease and 
desist from their unauthorized use of the Plaintiff's water. 
This Temporary Restraining Order has been issued 
without prior notice to the Defendants, for the reason that this 
Court has determined, on the basis of Plaintiff's Verified 
Complaint, Affidavit and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, 
copies of which are served upon the Defendants with this Order, 
that irreparable injury, loss and damage would be suffered by 
Plaintiff before notice could be served and a hearing scheduled. 
This Temporary Restraining Order shall automatically 
expire on the X d aY of W;/RfljUXs's , 1991, at the hour of 
ll-'l<f A-m. 
J/^j-A-
DATED this 
m. 
day of June, 1991, at the hour of 
BY THE COURT: 
S M I •WiM 
'* \ % 
EXHIBIT -£L_ I 
DALE M. OORIUS #0903 
Attorney for: 
P.O. Box U 
29 South Main Street 
Brigham City. Utah 84302 
723-5219 
SAVF" 
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IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BIRCH CREEK IRRIGATION and 
MARVIN R. MAYERS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
EARL J- PROTHERO and 
LYNN PROTHERO, 
Defendants• 
STIPULATION 
FOR 
CONTINUANCE 
Civil No. 9928 
Judge Don V. Tibbs 
COMES NOW Plaintiffs by and through their attorney, ANDREW 
B. BERRY, and Defendants by and through their attorney, DALE M. 
DORIUS, and stipulate that the Hearing on Plaintiffs1 Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction scheduled for the 17th day of July, 1991 
at 10:00 a.nu, may be continued to the 31st day of July, 1991. 
That said continuance is for the reason that the attorney for 
Defendants is scheduled for a two-day trial in Salt Lake County 
on the 16th and 17th of July. 
DATED\this / / day of July, 1991, 
ANDREW B. BERRY 
attorney for Plaintiffs 
DALE H- DORIUS 
Attorney for Defendants 
EXHIB/T _J4_ / 
FILED 
s , * \ ' r ^ -ifirw
 UTAH 
DALE M. DORIUS #0903 
Attorney for: 
P.O. Box U 
29 South Main Street 
Brigham City. Utah 84302 
723-5219 
IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT, 
BIRCH CREEK IRRIGATION and ] 
MARVIN R. MAYERS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EARL J. PROTHERO and 
LYNN PROTHERO, ] 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
I Civil No. 9928 
1 Judge Don V. Tibbs 
That upon the parties stipulation and good cause appearing, 
it is hereby ORDERED, that the Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction scheduled for the 17th day of July, 1991 
at 10:00 a.m., may be continued to the 31st day of July, 1991. 
/d 
DATED this /7^day of July, 1991. 
-
1
-' >M- 19 PH 12 37 
K ; ! :
 • • - • I S . I A N S E P , 
CLERK 
8 Y
 - ^ - ^ ^ ^ r O E P U T Y 
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR. 0309 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
P.O. Box 600 
62 West Main Street 
Moroni, Utah 84646 
Telephone: (801) 43 6-8 20 0 
BIRCH CREEK IRRIGATION and 
MARVIN R. MAYERS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EARL J. PROTHERO and 
LYNN PROTHERO, 
NOTICE OF ENTRY 
OF FINDINGS AND 
ORDER 
Civil No. 9928 
Ass igned t o : 
Honorab le Don V. T i b b s 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
ooOoo 
TO THE DEFENDANTS EARL J. PROTHERO AND LYNN PROTHERO 
You are hereby notified that pursuant to the provisions 
of the Rules of Practice and Rules Civil Proceedure that the 
Findings and Order mailed to you on the /sFj day of November, 
1991, shall be entered as proposed unless you file objections 
thereto within five (5) days of the receipt of this notice to 
you. 
DATED this C^f) day /ft NovemberX 1991. 
'ANDREW B.VBERRY, JR. 
Attorney for Plainti^ ffls 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Entry of Findings and 
Order to Dale M. Dorius, Attorney for Defendants, at P.O, Box U, 
29 South Main Street, Brigham City, Utah 84302, an£ to' A. Dean 
Jeffs, Attorney for Plaintiffs, ^p^^^oocth 100 ^as^, P.O,4 Box 
888, Provo, Utah 84603, on this 
1991. 
i EXHiBST A.-,.-
A. DEAN JEFFS, #1653 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
Attorneys at Law 
Attorney for Defendants 
90 North 100 East 
P. O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
FILC0 
I '.. L-
llUJLK&W 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BIRCH CREEK IRRIGATION and 
MARVIN R. MAYERS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EARL J. PROTHERO and 
LYNN PROTHERO, 
Defendants. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 9928 
Judge Don V. Tibbs 
BASED UPON Defendants' Motion for Extension of Time to File Objection to Plaintiffs' 
Proposed Findings and Order filed in the above-entitled Court on or about November 22, 1991, 
and with good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion for Extension of Time to File 
Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings to be filed tcnnflO) day3 after the Ukmuipt o f ^ 
procee4mgs-afe-delivered to Defendants' counsel is hereby granted. 
DATED and s ^ ^ \ l ^ l S ™ ! k D p D e c ^ r n b ^ ^ 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
I EXHIB IT - ^ 
District Court, S ta te of U t a h CALENDAR 
SANPETE r.OIINTY M A N T I OFPART 
Zase No. 
rv-QQ?fl 
Tape No. 
)ate 
.1 AM 11, 1992 
Time 
10:00 A.M. 
Proceeding 
TO SET A 
TRIAL 
Judge DV^IerkGPS 
BIRCH CREEK IRRIGATION and 
^ c M - r MINUTE ENTRY MENT
 T A P E L 0 G 
MARVIN R. MAYERS, V 
Plaintiff Appeared: 
ANDREW B. BERRY, J R . , 
Attorney Appeared: K 
EARL J . PROTHERO 
S. LYNN PROTHERO, 
Defendant 
A, DEAN JEFFS 
Attorney 
and 
Appeared: 
Appeared: 
Counter 
lumber MINUTE ENTRY 
3pfJ Cdi^^^Jniu^^cL 
s2u+ 
frbJfr Jl^tlrt^L/^Lf 
x^m.Q-^ 
7Y1A. 
% 
'Al 
*, (LM^JLLrtSsfiCf 
Vh\jljiA .Jhujj,-
^fiuA.^tr^ 
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VfULtdo )<A& C$SLu^ 
QjA. JJH/J ^JdJub A?7 
p? AL UL 
^2//X C/txZA ~&*u/ 
~YW\ 
^LLL 
^L 
-JHLjytxkJb 
UL l^JUAl 
OJJJUMJ 
JtjAsAuAJ,. JJJJ^TUrni± 
Counter 
Number MINUTE ENTRY 
X 
4Q\fyyuj/ipI^ 
/U tkJ] 
4\4L. 
JUL 
j+m 
W&M 
Jm&t 
tMi4i*LL& 
My//^/J xxm 
hi/uiut hi 
torn jr*< }^% '. /|>71-
